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NEW PERSPECTIVES ON COLLECTIVE LABOUR LAW - 
TRADE UNION RECOGNITION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
 
  





Drawing on the Manifesto for Labour Law published earlier this year, we consider 
Kahn-Freund’s assessment of British labour law (for the first three quarters of the 
twentieth century) as voluntarist, abstentionist collective laissez faire as espoused by 
Simpson. In contrast (and utilising Simpson’s tool of ‘law in context’), we point up the 
rôle of the state during this period in implementing labour law policy in support of 
extensive collective bargaining by the use of public administrative law powers (in the 
contemporaneous sense in which such law was understood). Drawing on this legacy, 
we set out the measures by which collective bargaining, in particular at sectoral level, 
might be restored. We deal with the establishment of Sectoral Employment 
Commissions consisting of equal numbers of employers and union representatives 
(similar to the old Joint Industrial Councils). In default, tripartite bodies based on the 
extinct Wages Councils would be established. We propose the (re)use of ‘fair wages 
clauses’ (i.e. public procurement arrangements) to require participation in collective 
bargaining and the observance of collective agreements. We consider the reciprocal 
issues of representation at the workplace, union access thereto and reform of the 






The biggest problem in collective labour law in the UK is the rapidly declining 




World War collective bargaining density was reported to be 85%.1   Although there 
were fluctuations thereafter, by the time of Thatcher’s accession in 1979, coverage 
stood at an estimated 82%.  Inexorable decline has followed during the last 37 years,2 
coverage today being around 20% and falling.  This means that in the course of a 
working life, collective bargaining density has fallen from more than four out of five 
workers to little more than one in five, lower than before the First World War. 
 
This is a not a problem unique to the UK, though the longevity and consistency of the 
decline is probably greater here than elsewhere. As it is, the UK has the lowest level 
of collective bargaining of any country in the EU, except for Lithuania.3  The UK is 
one of only a few EU states where collective bargaining density currently is less than 
50% (though density is falling elsewhere as well).4  But although we are in the 
relegation zone, we are not yet bottom of the league of developed nations, since we 
have a coverage higher than the United States, whose ineffective and controversial 
trade union recognition laws we have largely adopted.5 
 
We and others have argued in A Manifesto for Labour Law that it is vital that the 
trend is reversed and collective bargaining coverage restored.6  The Manifesto set out 
the reasons for rebuilding collective bargaining, which it referred to as the Four 
Pillars of collective bargaining.  Although space does not permit a full reiteration 
here, the Four Pillars highlight collective bargaining as amongst the principal means 
of achieving (i) workplace democracy, (ii) social justice, (iii) economic efficiency, 
 
1 Ministry of Labour and National Service, Report 1939 - 1946, Cmd 7225 (1947).  
2 See K.D. Ewing, J. Hendy and C. Jones (eds), A Manifesto for Labour Law: 
Towards A Revision of Workers’ Rights (Liverpool: IER, 2006), 4 and fns 27 and 30. 
3 L. Fulton, Worker Representation in Europe (Brussels: Labour Research 
Department and ETUI, 2013). 
4 Discussed in K.D. Ewing and J. Hendy, Reconstruction after the Crisis: A Manifesto 
for Collective Bargaining (Liverpool: IER, 2013), at 2, and 34-39. 
5 For a sympathetic (although dated, still relevant,) critique of the US system (and an 
argument that the problems can be cured), see W.B. Gould, Agenda for Reform - The 
Future of Employment Relationships and the Law (Boston: MIT, 1996). 
6 Ewing, Hendy and Jones n.2, fn 2. We acknowledge the force of the arguments by 





and (iv) the fulfilment of the UK’s relevant international legal obligations,7 consistent 
with the rule of law. 
 
As Bob Simpson reminds us, however, we need to be clear about why we are 
addressing the problem of collective bargaining through law.8 In the pages that follow 
we take the need to halt the decline as a given and focus instead on the role of law in 
building the structures necessary to restore extensive collective bargaining coverage.   
In doing so, we warmly acknowledge the learning and scholarship of Bob Simpson, 
particularly in relation to the trade union recognition procedures first introduced in 
1971.9 While our endeavours have been enriched by Simpson’s insight and wisdom, it 
goes without saying that we are not always in full agreement.  
 
2. THE LEGACY OF COLLECTIVE LABOUR LAW 
 
It is commonplace that Simpson’s work is strongly influenced by Kahn-Freund, and 
as such he is perhaps one of the most uncritical exponents of Kahn-Freund’s 
interpretation of the development of British labour law.10  It would be difficult to find 
a scholar more committed to Kahn-Freund’s ideas of voluntarism, abstention and 
collective laissez faire, or a scholar more sensitive to and aware of the distinction 
between auxiliary, regulatory and restrictive roles of the State.11   This is most visible 
in Lewis and Simpson who wrote: 
 
 
7 See Ewing, Hendy and Jones n.2, ch 2. 
8 B. Simpson, Trade Union Recognition and the Law (Liverpool: IER, 1991), 31. 
9 Apart from works cited below, Simpson’s important work on or dealing with 
recognition includes R.C. Simpson and J.C. Wood, Industrial Relations and the 1971 
Act (London: Pitman, 1973), ch 9.    
10 As to Kahn-Freund, see especially, the two classic pieces: O. Kahn-Freund, 'Legal 
Framework', in A. Flanders and H. Clegg (eds), The System of Industrial Relations in 
Great Britain (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1954), 42, and O. Kahn-Freund, 'Labour 
Law' in M. Ginsberg (ed), Law and Opinion in England in the Twentieth Century 
(London: Stevens & Sons, 1959). 
11 Other sympathetic accounts include A. Bogg, The Democratic Aspects of Trade 
Union Recognition (Oxford: Hart, 2009), ch 1; D. Brodie, A History of British Labour 
Law 1867 – 1945 (Oxford: Hart, 2003), and P L Davies and M Freedland, Labour 
Legislation and Public Policy (Oxford: OUP, 1993). For an important re-assessment 
of Kahn-Freund, see R. Dukes, ‘Otto Kahn-Freund and Collective Laissez-Faire: An 




In the period after the war industrial self government was elevated to an 
ideological belief common to both sides of industry.  Abstention of the law 
was a central plank of the prevailing voluntarist ethos in industry.  The 
nineteenth century doctrine of individual laissez faire gave way to what Kahn- 
Freund brilliantly described as collective laissez faire.12   
 
In the same pages, Lewis and Simpson wrote that ‘the ethos of voluntarism grew out 
of the relatively harmonious social and prosperous economic climate of the mid 
twentieth century’,13 which is an understanding that may need to be revised as we 
become more aware of government anxieties during the Cold War, and the role 
played by the official trade union leadership in managing these anxieties. It is true that 
‘there was a notable degree of consensus over the legitimacy of the labour movement 
and a whole range of fundamental socio-economic issues’.14 But this was a temporal 
consensus that was gradually to evaporate as the external threat dissipated and neo-
liberal ideology gained traction. 
 
In any event the collective bargaining structures operating from the mid-20th century 
had been developing for some time before then, and had been revived and created in a 
much more troubled time.15  So, while it is claimed that ‘before the 1970s, collective 
bargaining was an extra legal process’,16 that description gives no clue as to the role 
of the State in creating the structures in which the process of collective bargaining 
took place and in which disputes could be resolved when it failed.   It may be more 
accurate to say that collective bargaining was not a statutory process of the kind found 
in the NLRA.   But it was nevertheless a process established by the exercise of State 
power, which in turn clearly had legal authority.   In that sense, it was a legal process. 
 
 
12 R. Lewis and B. Simpson, Striking a Balance? Employment Law after the 1980 Act 
(Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 1981), 9-10. 
13 Ibid., 10. 
14 Ibid. 
15 See K. D. Ewing, ‘The State and Industrial Relations:  Collective Laissez Faire 
Revisited (1998) 5 HSIR 1. Also, C. Howell, Trade Unions and the State – The 
Construction of Industrial Relations Institutions in Britain 1890-2000 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2005). 





Is remains uncertain why the depiction of the principles of abstentionism, voluntarism 
and collective laissez faire became accepted so widely as the characteristic features of 
the British system, when at least in relation to collective bargaining, the evidence of a 
strong government input in the construction of the procedures is very clear.  Although 
not expressed in Simpson’s writing, there is a lingering sense that for some, these 
principles were a matter of pride, a badge of labour’s self-reliance on its own power, 
while for others they were a demonstration of the political maturity of the UK, in the 
sense that procedures could be established by the power of reason and pragmatism on 
the part of workers, employers and unions, without the input of the State. 
 
From the trade union side, of course, there is also the sense that the foregoing 
ideology can be a shield that could protect workers and trade unions from the exercise 
of the restrictive powers of the State.   The elevation of these principles to a status 
equivalent to a constitutional convention would be to impose a strong source of 
restraint on government and a defence for trade unions when under attack.   But while 
some might celebrate the mantra that what the State does not give the State cannot 
take away,17 we found out soon enough in the Thatcher years not only just what the 
State did in fact provide, but that the State could take away even those things that it 
did not provide. 
 
The other curious feature of the voluntarist, abstentionist, and collective laissez faire 
school of labour law was the compatibility of these principles with the methodology 
employed by its teachers and pupils.   The great methodological contribution of the 
foregoing (at a very early stage in the development of modern British scholarship) 
was an emphasis on the need to see ‘law in context’, in making the case for which 
Simpson has been a pre-eminent exponent in work that has been highly critical of 
legal formalism.   This is expressed clearly in his OJLS piece where he argues most 
forcefully for ‘law in context’, to help explain how the law developed and its impact 
on actual behaviour.18 
 
 
17 Kahn-Freund n.10, above, at 244. 




But just as there are questions about the historical accuracy of voluntarism, 
abstentionism, and collective laissez faire, and the reasons why these principles were 
so widely accepted in the face of a different body of evidence, so too there is a sense 
of contradiction between principle and method.   One of the (respectfully gentle) 
criticisms that can be levelled against these principles is that of a certain demure 
lowering of the eyes in the face of State power and law in all its manifestations.   The 
classic principles are sustainable only if we consider law to take a particular form, 
which seems at odds with the need to contextualise, suggesting a need to take a broad 
view of what we consider to be law in the first place.   
 
As argued elsewhere, the British industrial relations system that has now largely gone 
was founded in public law:  it owed more to Laski than to Kahn-Freund.19   But as 
such it was a different kind of public law than the public law we know today:  it was 
about creating rather than containing institutions; about the power of the 
administration to build structures, rather than the power of the judges to pull them 
down.   There is virtually no acknowledgement of the public law powers of the State 
in the voluntarism, abstentionism, and collective laissez faire literature, which is 
rightly concerned with labour’s ‘Magna Carta’,20 but perhaps not enough with 
labour’s institutional forms or how these forms were created.     
 
3. THE LEGACY OF STATE ENGAGEMENT 
 
Having suggested that the development of British labour law has sometimes been 
rather too narrowly viewed, we have some responsibility to make the case that there 
has been strong State engagement and to identify the forms that this engagement took.   
As already suggested the construction of collective bargaining machinery in this 
 
19 H. Laski, ‘The Growth of Administrative Discretion’ (1923) 1 Public 
Administration 92. See also W.I. Jennings, ‘The Report on Ministers’ Powers (1932) 
10 Public Administration 333, and W.I. Jennings, The Law and the Constitution, 5th 
ed (London: University of London Press, 1959), pp 5-6.   Some of Jennings’ work in 
later life was a pale shadow of his apparently progressive youth, as is so often the 
case.  See W.I. Jennings, The Queen’s Government, revised ed. (London: Penguin 
Books, 1965), and W.I. Jennings, The British Constitution (Cambridge: CUP, 1971). 
The former, in particular, includes some ripe passages. 
20 As the Trade Disputes Act 1906 is ‘often called’:  H.W. Laidler, History of 




country was an exercise in administrative law rather more than labour law, and to this 
end took three forms.   Before considering the latter, it is necessary to reinforce what 
we mean by administrative law, which in the first half of the twentieth century was 
not used as a synonym for judicial review of administrative action as it is today.  
 
The real starting point for the exercise of administrative power was a government 
department, in this case the Ministry of Labour, which was established by the New 
Ministries and Secretaries Act 1916, along with the Ministry of Food and the Ministry 
of Shipping.   In modern times, such formality is generally not required, and new 
ministries are now created without the need for fresh primary legislation, under wide 
powers of secondary legislation conferred upon the Crown by the Ministers of the 
Crown Act 1975.   The latter makes extensive provision for the re-organisation of 
central government, and perhaps also for the creation of new departments in the event 
of statutory authority being necessary for this purpose.21 
 
The new department inherited responsibilities previously performed by the Board of 
Trade, as well as all other departments with responsibility for labour.   This would 
include obligations arising under such formative measures as the Conciliation Act 
1896 and the Trade Boards Act 1909, which were to be radically revised, revamped 
and expanded.   For the purposes of what follows, however, it is important to 
emphasise that the Ministry of Labour was a creation of statute, assuming wide-
ranging responsibilities for ensuring compliance with various labour standards, 
establishing Joint Industrial Councils, resolving industrial disputes, administering 
unemployment insurance, and managing labour exchanges (now job centres).22    
 
 
21 For an account, see A.W. Bradley, K.D. Ewing and C.J.S. Knight, Constitutional 
and Administrative Law, 16th ed (Harlow: Pearson, 2015), ch 11C. Also, R. Brazier, 
Ministers of the Crown (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997).  
22 The 1916 Act transferred to the Ministry the ‘powers and duties’ of the Board of 
Trade, as well as other departments and authorities ‘relating to labour or industry’.  
See generally R. Lowe, Adjusting to Democracy, The Role of the Ministry of Labour 
in British Politics, 1916-1939 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986).  Intervention to 
resolve disputes took place by virtue of statutory powers of conciliation and 
arbitration contained in the Conciliation Act 1896 and the Industrial Courts Act 1919.  
And note also Munitions of War Act 1915 and the legacy of war-time regulation:  
G.R. Rubin, War, Law, and Labour. The Munitions Acts, State Regulation, and the 




The responsibility for Joint Industrial Councils was part of the implementation of the 
Whitley Committee’s recommendations made in 1917,23 shortly after the Ministry 
was established.   This provided a blueprint in terms of a model for industrial relations 
in the post-war era, no doubt with an eye on what was happening in other European 
capitals at time.   Part of the blueprint was for the establishment of multi-employer 
bargaining procedures in those industries that could sustain them, with the radically 
revised, revamped and expanded trade boards dealing with those industries where for 
whatever reason such procedures would not be possible, but conveying the message 
that mandatory arrangements would follow if a JIC was not established. 
 
But although the existence of a government department was an essential step in the 
promotion of collective bargaining, that department needed not only a plan, but also 
the legal authority to implement the plan.   Yet this was a plan that was to be 
implemented without any specific legal authority or legal regulation as to the means 
employed, Ministry officials relying on the wide discretionary powers vested in or 
assumed by the department.24   In other words, this was a government department 
established by statute with unconstrained discretionary powers to promote the 
interests of the department.   So far as collective bargaining is concerned, these 
interests were not determined by Parliament but by successive ministers. 
 
The latter made it clear to Parliament that it was their duty to promote collective 
bargaining.25  Specifically, the Ministry’s duty was to implement the Whitley 
blueprint, which it loyally did until 1921 when government policy changed in the face 
of changing economic conditions.  But the commitment was restored in the early 
 
23 Cd 8606 (1917). 
24 Of course, in the background were important contextual factors both stimulating 
government policy and promoting acceptance of it: the power of labour exhibited in 
the Great Labour Unrest of 1910-1913, the development in wartime of national 
dispute settlement by national arbitration established under the Munitions of War Act, 
the spectre of revolution after October 1917, events on Clydeside in January 1919 and 
revolution in Germany leading to the founding of the Weimar Republic the same year.  
25 Most explicitly by Ernest Brown who told the House of Commons that ‘it is 
becoming increasingly recognised that our voluntary collective bargaining system is 
one of the most potent instruments for the stability of our national life. That being so, 
it is our duty to foster and encourage the establishment of such machinery over an 




1930s26 in the aftermath of the Great Crash - with similar developments near 
contemporaneously in Europe as the developed capitalist world grappled to find the 
economic instruments to end the great Depression.27  At the same time and for the 
same reason a commitment to sector wide regulation of working conditions was made 
in the United States by the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933.28    
 
The latter was struck down as unconstitutional,29 leading to the now much maligned 
NLRA with its exclusive focus on enterprise based collective bargaining.30  History 
took a different turn in the UK, with collective bargaining policy continuing under 
Bevin’s leadership during the Second World War, fortified by compulsory arbitration 
where disputes could not be settled by voluntary mechanisms.31 Though the 
legislative imposition of compulsory arbitration was largely lifted after 195132, 
support for collective bargaining continued under different governments thereafter, so 
that, for example,  the post-war legislation establishing the nationalised industries 
contained what was in effect a statutory requirement to bargain collectively.33   
 
26 And Fair Wages clauses were applied in the 1930s in many industries by legislation 
as a condition for the grant of government assistance: Ministry of Labour, Industrial 
Relations Handbook (1961 ed), chs 9 and 10. 
27 In 1936 France’s Popular Front government established the right to bargain 
collectively in the accords de Matignon which settled the general strike of that year. 
In Ireland the Conditions of Employment Act 1936, provided by s.50, (in relation to 
wages payable for particular forms of ‘industrial work’) for the registration of 
collective agreements on wages made between employers and unions, for the 
universal application of such registered agreements and for their enforcement in the 
particular industry once the terms of the agreement had been registered and published 
in the Official Journal, Iris Oifigiúil. In Sweden the Saltsjöben Agreement, signed in 
1938, cemented the consensual approach to collective bargaining and industrial 
dispute resolution which remains the bedrock of the Nordic model. 
28 Part of the New Deal: A.J. Badger, FDR:  The First 100 Days (US: Hill & Wanhg 
Inc., 2008), 98 – 105. 
29 Schechter Poultry Corp v United States, 295 US 495 (1935).  
30 The aims of the NLRA as set out in its preamble should not be under-estimated, 
which makes the disappointment all the greater, even if it was probably addressed to 
the Supreme Court with a constitutional challenge in mind, on which see NLRB v 
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp, 301 US 1 (1937). 
31 Conditions of Employment and National Arbitration Order SR&O 1940, No 1305.  
32 See the discussion in Wedderburn, ‘Change, Struggle and Ideology in British 
Labour Law’ in Lord Wedderburn (ed), Labour Law and Freedom (London: 
Lawrence and Wishart, 1995), at 8-15. 
33 Such as Coal Industry Nationalisation Act 1946, s 46, discussed in NCB v NUM 





Largely unconstrained by law, bureaucratic power was said to bully those who could 
not be persuaded,34 in some cases by the threat of the imposition of a Wages Council 
for the industry in question:  an early example of what Bercusson was to refer 
famously as ‘bargaining in the shadow of the law’. Although there were of course 
procedures for the extension of collective agreements together with a number of ‘fair 
wages’ clauses based on collective agreements,35 these now seem relatively incidental 
and insignificant, falling far short of the full legalisation of national agreements as the 
TUC had demanded in 1931.36   The key point missed in traditional accounts of 
labour law is the role of the State in building the collective bargaining structures, 
without which such initiatives were sterile.37 
 
4. REDISCOVERING THE LEGACY 
 
The key features of the foregoing account are that (i) by a largely administrative 
process, (ii) the State created a regulatory system of widespread application, (iii) with 
an unsettled question of ‘legalisation’ dangling like a hanging chad at the time the 
system began to disintegrate.    The important point here is that it was a regulatory 
process by which terms and conditions of employment were concluded by trade 
unions and employers’ associations applicable to all the workers employed by 
businesses who were members of the associations in question.   By various extension 
 
34 See Lowe n.22.     
35 Notably the Terms and Conditions of Employment Act 1959, s 8, and the 
Employment Protection Act 1975, s.98, on which see B. Bercusson, Fair Wages 
Resolutions (London: Mansell, 1978).  
36 See Ewing n.15. It should be noted that employers too have long been concerned 
about the dangers of undercutting the agreed wage rates, see for example, Hilton v 
Eckersley (1855) 6 E&B 47. 
37 By 1960 there were an estimated 200 JICs – structures which did not just appear 
from nowhere:  Ministry of Labour, Industrial Relations Handbook, n.26 above, 25.   
One last legal measure underpinning extensive collective agreements was the capacity 
of unions lawfully to organise secondary industrial action, certainly from the Trades 
Disputes Act 1906 onwards (Conway v Wade [1909] AC 606). This right was 
removed in 1990 as the culmination of ‘enterprise confinement’ (Lord Wedderburn, 
‘Freedom of Association and Philosophies of Labour Law’ (1989) 18 ILJ 1, at 27-30. 
in breach of the European Social Charter, Art 6(4) and ILO Convention 87. But not in 
breach of the ECHR: RMT v UK [2014] IRLR 467; (2015) 60 EHRR 10, which sets 
out the relevant international jurisprudence and gives an example of how the absence 




mechanisms operating between 1940 and 1980, they could be extended to non-
federated firms.38 
 
Though the mechanisms to achieve it differed from one country to another, the effect 
in the UK was similar to (if often not so precise or near universal as) the European 
model of sector-wide collective bargaining arrangements. This contrasted with the 
weaker form of collective bargaining developed in the United States, which was 
required by default to adopt an exclusively representative system of bargaining via a 
bargaining agent chosen in an election of the workers in a bargaining unit.  Although 
these agreements might cover vast numbers of workers, they were typically single 
employer agreements confined to the enterprise and applicable only to workers in the 
enterprise in question.   
 
This is the only model of collective bargaining permitted in the United States for 
constitutional reasons, the Supreme Court objecting to the fact that in order to have 
general effect the US codes under the NIRA had to be approved by presidential order.   
This gave them a legally binding effect in the sector in question, which was treated by 
the US Supreme Court as meaning that the industry codes produced by this process 
had the status of law. In the United States’ ultra-liberal constitution, however, only 
Congress can make law, with the result that the codes were treated as being 
unconstitutional, in a system where legislative authority is vested only in a legislative 
assembly whose members are elected and popularly accountable every four years.39 
 
This contrasts with the social democratic model of law making which was to be found 
in the now eclipsed Social Europe.40   This is a model which allows for parallel law-
making by social institutions, including collective bargaining and social dialogue as 
the highest expression of what is in effect a process of collective bargaining between 
the social partners.   The legitimacy of the former (collective bargaining) is to be seen 
 
38 See n. 37 above. 
39 For the application of this constitutional doctrine in Ireland, see J. Hendy, The 
McGowan judgment and Collective Bargaining in Ireland 
http://www.ictu.ie/download/pdf/collective_bargaining_ireland_jan_30.pdf discussing 
McGowan v Labour Court [2013] IESC 21, and John Grace Fried Chicken Ltd v 
Labour Court [2011] IEHC 277. 




in instruments such as the Posted Workers Directive where ‘universally applicable’ 
collective agreements rank equally with legislation as a form of regulation to which 
effect is to given;41 while the legitimacy of the latter (social dialogue) is to be seen in 
the UEAPME decision of the ECJ where it was said memorably that: 
 
…the principle of democracy on which the Union is founded requires – in the 
absence of the participation of the European Parliament in the legislative 
process – that the participation of the people be otherwise secured, in this 
instance through the parties representative of management and labour ….42 
 
Yet notwithstanding this endorsement (not to mention its treaty base),43 Social 
Dialogue at EU level is dying, if not already dead.44 The pressure to decentralise 
collective bargaining is driven largely if not exclusively by the European Commission 
using powers under Title VIII of the TFEU to require member states to decentralise 
and deregulate collective bargaining. The Commission Report, Labour Market 
Developments in Europe,45 stated that the new economic and political instruments of 
control should result in a ‘reduction in the wage-setting power of trade unions’. The 
result is that: 
 
…the reforms have resulted in a dramatic decline in collective bargaining 
coverage, a breakdown of collective bargaining, a strong downward pressure 
 
41 Directive 96/71/EC (posting of workers in the framework of the provision of 
services), Art 3(1). 
42 Case T-135/96, UEAPME v European Council [1998] ECR II-2335, at para 89.   
See B. Bercusson, ‘Democratic Legitimacy and European Labour Law’ (1998) 28 ILJ 
153. 
43 TFEU, Arts 154, 155. 
44 According to First Preliminary Outline on a European Social Pillar, ‘Well-
functioning social dialogue requires autonomous and representative social partners 
with the capacities to reach collective agreements. Given the decreases in terms of 
organisational density and representativeness, social partners need to further build 
their capacities to engage in a better functioning and effective social dialogue’. But 
there is no sense of Commission responsibility for contributing to the problem of 
‘representativeness’ or any commitment on their part to deal with it (SWD2016 51 
(final), [10]. 
45 European Commission Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs , 




on wages leading to deflationary tendencies, downward wage competition and 
an overall reduction in the wage-setting power of trade unions.46 
 
The fight to defend the Code du Travail in France against the socialist government’s 
El Khomri reforms (along Commission lines) was taken to the streets of Paris and 
other cities in the summer of 2016.47   It is ironic that the EU seeks to replicate a 
system of labour relations more like that of the UK, where industry wide collective 
bargaining has largely disappeared (and just at the time the UK itself is about to 
disappear from the EU).48   Yet if collective bargaining is to survive as a regulatory 
institution benefitting the vast majority of workers and hence the economy, rather 
than a representative activity for an ever smaller minority, this will have to change in 
the UK as in Europe.     
 
Indeed, unless it changes there is a real danger that collective bargaining will become 
virtually extinct within a generation, with profound effects for the role of trade 
unions.   The challenge for collective labour lawyers is thus (i) to make the case for 
regulatory collective bargaining, and (ii) to propose the means by which it can be 
done.  It is our good fortune that in this country we have a template, the UK having 
been a pioneer of this model of collective bargaining.   Other European countries did 
it differently and lessons can be learned from all.  The UK has had about a century of 
experience, though it would not be possible today to rebuild these structures by the 
 
46 I. Schömann, ‘Reforms of collective labour law in time of crisis: towards a new 
landscape for industrial relations in the European Union?’, in D. Brodie, N. Busby 
and R. Zahn (eds), The Future Regulation of Work, New Concepts, New Paradigms 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 152. The techniques employed consist, in 
summary:  abolition of national minimum wage fixing agreements; limiting the 
duration of the effect of collective agreements; increasing scope for derogating from 
sector wide agreements; restricting the extension of collective agreements; and 
extending collective bargaining to non-union groupings. 
47 On 4 November 2015, France’s labour minister, Myriam El Khomri, launched a 
reform programme the two main objectives of which are to revise the entire Code and 
to give company-level agreements a central rôle over sector-wide agreements.   On 
the context of this, see T. Piketty, ‘Labour Law Reform in France:  An Appalling 
Mess’, 2 Juillet 2016:  http://piketty.blog.lemonde.fr/2016/07/02/labour-law-reform-
in-france-an-appaling-mess/ (dealing with ‘The illusion of balanced company-wide 
agreements’). 
48 A. Bogg and K.D. Ewing, ‘The Continuing Evolution of European Labour Law and 
the Changing Context for Trade Union Organising’ (2017) 38 Comparative Labour 




means used in early years of the twentieth century and in particular from 1934 
onwards.   
 
This is largely because the legal context has changed, most significantly in the 
development of administrative law and its changing emphasis as a source of 
government restraint rather than a source of government power.   Thirty five years of 
neo-liberalism and the drive to a low-wage, low-investment, service-based economy 
has also deeply affected the attitude of the principal players, employers and unions. 
Indeed many workers have never experienced the benefits of collective bargaining. 
The consequence is that in order to recreate the regulatory bargaining model, there 
will need to be a much more structured legal framework, not least to reduce the risk of 
any such framework being a playground for obstructive administrative lawyers.49    
  
 





5. REBUILDING A REGULATORY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
SYSTEM  
 
The ‘system’ in place in the post-war era was one of sectoral bargaining underpinning 
establishment level negotiation. It was built mainly by bureaucratic power, 
underwritten by statutory bodies in the form of wages councils and reinforced by ad 
hoc extension mechanisms and other indirect props.    The sceptics of course will say 
that this cannot be recreated in present circumstances. They will say that what was 
done in the past in this country and throughout Western Europe, and even in the 
United States (until the Supreme Court stepped in)50 gives no guidance now:  the 
economy has changed, with growing casualisation, flexibility and decentralisation.    
 
Quite so: these are the very conditions that drove policy makers to establish the 
system in the first place, and which are now a consequence of its destruction.     It is 
true that a modern scheme in a different legal culture could not operate as it did in the 
past; the core framework would now need to be a statutory framework, which would 
have to reduce discretionary power to a minimum.    Clarity of intention of such a 
scheme (to address the Four Pillars) is not enough.   To achieve the objective, as Bob 
Simpson forcefully reminds us, it is vital to have regard to the context of the proposal.   
Previous attempts to legislate on collective bargaining (in the admittedly different 
context of enterprise bargaining) have foundered on such neglect.51 
 
The first of two major contextual issues is political: as Simpson highlights in relation 
to the statutory recognition scheme in 2000, it had been burdened from the start by 
mixed and highly equivocal political messages about the government’s commitment 
to collective bargaining.52 Not only was such a commitment lacking in terms of wider 
public policy, it was also the case that the potentially liberating collective bargaining 
 
50 See Badger, n.28, 104: 546 codes had been negotiated, though Badger paints a 
picture of a huge bureaucratic headache, which was not reported as a feature of the 
British implementation of this model. 
51 See esp. Simpson, n.16. 
52 See B. Simpson, ‘Trade Union Recognition and the Law, A New Approach - Parts I 
and II of Schedule A1 to the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 




arrangements were compromised by the contradictory retention of the much of the 
Thatcherite legacy.  Blair’s muscular commitment on the eve of the 1997 election that 
the UK would retain the most restrictive union laws in the Western world was not 
auspicious.53 
 
But apart from commitment, there is an even bigger question of political context 
which emerges from the foregoing.   An essential feature in the past was the presence 
of a government department with responsibility to protect the interest of workers and 
to represent the voice of workers in government.   That has gone with the abolition of 
the Ministry of Labour and its successor departments.   This is not to say of course 
that a government department should be established solely to promote collective 
bargaining; but it is to say that there is a need within the structure of government for a 
department dedicated to the interest of workers with a status equal to that of other 
interests represented at the Cabinet table.54 
 
One of the responsibilities of a new government department would relate to the 
second contextual matter to be taken into account. This is the apparent lack of 
representative capacity on the employer and trade union sides respectively to 
entertain a system of multi-employer, sector wide, regulatory collective bargaining.   
That too was a problem at the end of the 19th century, especially in the sweated trades 
where trade boards were imposed. It was overcome then and can be again.   It is true 
that the number of employers’ associations has declined from the mid-20th century 
(though there are still 53 on the Certification Officer’s list),55 and those which do exist 
 
53 The Times, 31 March 1997. And as reported to the Guardian, 27 April 1997:   
‘People on the Left have got to understand the realities of the economic world. You 
will do more to prevent people being treated as commodities by giving them the best 
educational skills and opportunities, and by having an employment service that is 
dynamic, than you will by trying to protect the workforce with over-restrictive union 
legislation’ (ibid).  
54 It should also undertake the function of planning the workforce needed for the 
future, much to the benefit of employers: see Ewing, Hendy and Jones n.2, 16-18. 
55 Certification Officer, Annual Report 2015-16 (2016), 11. There are another 39 
which are described as ‘scheduled’, which means that they fall within the statutory 
definition of an employers’ associations but have chosen not to be listed.  They must 
nevertheless comply with a number of statutory duties.  As the CO points out, there 
may be other bodies falling within the definition of which he is unaware (ibid., at 8).   




(such as the EEF) appear largely to have adapted their role to become lobbyists rather 
than parties to collective agreements.56      
 
Employers’ associations are currently defined by section 122 of the Trade Union and 
Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (TULRCA) as bodies whose principal 
purposes include the regulation of relations between employers and workers or trade 
unions.   Where organisations within that definition currently do not exist, it is 
implausible to believe that there are not representative organisations in all sectors to 
act on behalf of employer interests. 57    In the modern era, all industries lobby 
government and as Prem Sikka pointed out powerfully: 
 
big business has been using collective bargaining for decades to advance its 
interests. Banks, supermarkets, phone, gas, water, electricity and other 
companies collectively negotiate with governments to secure their economic 
interests. Finance directors of the 100 largest UK-listed companies, known as 
The 100 Group, pool their resources to secure advantages by shaping 
consumer protection, tax, regulation, competition, trade and other government 
policies. If big business is able to engage in collective bargaining, it is only 
fair that workers should also be enabled by law to collectively advance their 
interests.58 
 
However, employer capacity is one thing, but employer resistance another. How can 
unwilling employers be persuaded to take part in these arrangements?   And how can 
large multinationals with generations of hostility to trade unions throughout their 
global operations be compelled to do so?   This brings us back to the question of 
 
a total annual expenditure of £445,841,000, both increases on the previous year (ibid., 
Appendix 6). 
56 On the other hand, the accelerations of mergers and acquisitions means that there 
are a number of very big players as well as the multitude of SMEs. 
57 Employers appear to have no difficulty in establishing associations for mutually 
desirable objectives, including price fixing cartels and blacklisting workers – as to the 
latter, see D. Smith and P. Chamberlain, Blacklisted – The Secret War between Big 
Business and Union Activists, 2nd ed (New Internationalist, 2016). As to the former 
see the examples (including the LIBOR scandal) at 
http://www.tutor2u.net/economics/blog/oligopoly-recent-examples-of-price-fixing-
behaviour. 




power, and the coercive power of the State in particular, to be reclaimed as a force for 
good rather than as the enemy as it has been by some workers for almost two 
generations.59   In the modern legal climate a system of regulatory collective 
bargaining needs to anticipate that power and harness it in a productive manner.   
Apart from obligation, persuasion, incentives and penalties,60 other coercive options 
include: 
 
• Consistently with ILO Convention No. 94, there should be no question of any 
public sector contract, advertising or government licence being awarded to, or 
any public service delivered by, an employer who refuses to participate 
directly or indirectly through a representative association in collective 
bargaining either at sectoral or enterprise level (on which see below).  This 
would be an adapted and expanded version of fair wages resolutions and 
clauses operating in the past, designed to ‘persuade’ but not ‘compel’. 
 
• Where multi-employer collective bargaining takes place, it should not be 
possible for any employer in the sector in question to refuse to abide by the 
terms of the relevant agreement.   The early TUC idea of ‘legalisation’ should 
be given statutory effect so that the terms of sector wide agreements become 
mandatory terms of all contracts of employment in the sector in question, 
including non participating firms.61 This was an essential feature of the wages 
councils (which, indeed, imposed criminal sanctions on those who did not 
comply – a measure we do not propose). 
     
  
 
59 T May, ‘But a change has got to come. It’s time to remember the good that 
government can do’, Speech to Conservative Party Conference, 5 October 2016:   
http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/theresa-mays-speech-conservative-party-
8983265. 
60 For example, should companies that seek advantage by not dealing with trade 
unions be required not only to pay a mandatory penalty to workers (on which see 
below), but also pay a higher rate of taxation for unfair competition? 
61 Employers would thus be bound automatically by a process in which they do not 
participate; some may thus be inclined to participate to have some influence or control 





6. ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF A NEW FRAMEWORK 
 
All of which brings us to the hard question:   what would such a scheme look like?   
And how could it be constructed?  Clearly the finer details are beyond the scope of 
this short article, which is designed principally to map out a framework to reverse the 
current slide to a Victorian system of labour law.    Clearly too, this is not a matter for 
the exclusive engagement of labour lawyers, standing as it does on the boundaries of 
public administration, administrative law (as originally conceived), industrial 
relations, as well as our own discipline.   That said, it is obviously necessary 
nevertheless to identify the core challenges and to suggest how they might be met.     
 
The first issue to address relates to identifying each sector for the purposes of sectoral 
bargaining.   This would have to be done by legislation, and we propose that it would 
be the responsibility of the Ministry of Labour to create the sectoral map for this 
purpose, in consultation with employers and trade unions.   In creating that map 
Ministry officials would doubtless take into account the boundaries of the more than 
200 previous JICs and Wages Councils (where still relevant), the Standard 
Occupational Classification of jobs and the indexes of services and industries 
maintained by the ONS, as well as the law and practice of other countries with 
extensive sectoral bargaining. 
 
Within each category there would doubtless have to be numerous sub-categories.   
But once the basic framework is identified, in the interests of the integrity, 
permanence and formality of the procedures, it should be set out in a statutory 
instrument (as in an SI), approved by Parliament with any changes to the structure 
requiring formal amendment, and subsequent parliamentary approval.62 There are 
some self-contained industries where the need for sectoral collective bargaining is 
particularly urgent: care homes, agriculture, small deliveries (drivers and cyclists), 
and fast-food outlets, being immediately obvious candidates, suggesting the 
possibility that a scheme of this kind could be rolled out gradually. 
 
62 For a different approach (and less formal) see Wages Councils Act 1979, Part I 





Within all identified sectors, the legislation would provide for the establishment of a 
Sectoral Employment Commission to perform tasks that in the past would have been 
discharged by a Joint Industrial Council.   There would be equal representation of 
trade unions and employers, with any disputes about representation on the workers’ 
side to be resolved by the TUC Disputes Principles and Procedures, revised again if 
necessary.63 The CBI could have responsibility for representation disputes on the 
employers’ side.  Failure on the part of employers to take part would be addressed by 
the formation of a tripartite body similar in form to the wages councils, with empty 
chairs if necessary.   There would be no question of an employer’s veto. 
 
It would be the central responsibility of these Commissions (whether bipartite or 
tripartite) to set the terms and conditions of employment for the workers in the sector 
in question.   In terms of the subject matter of negotiations and standard setting, ILO 
Convention No. 154 describes collective bargaining to mean  
 
(a) determining working conditions and terms of employment; and/or 
(b) regulating relations between employers and workers; and/or 
(c) regulating relations between employers or their organisations and a 
workers' organisation or workers' organisations. 
 
In our view, the jurisdiction of Sectoral Employment Commissions should include as 
minimum mandatory terms for negotiation the foregoing requirements of ILO 
Convention No. 154. It ought of course to be possible for the parties to extend the 
scope of collective bargaining in whatever direction they agree to.  
 
Thus Sectoral Collective Agreements might be expected to cover, for example, pay 
(basic and enhanced rates), allowances, benefits, pensions, hours, flexibility, working 
time, breaks and holidays, health and safety, the physical conditions of work, 
 
63 Legal constraints on the TUC procedures in TULRCA 1992, s 174 (as introduced 
by the Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Act 1993, s14), should be 
removed. On the 1993 Act’s changes, see B. Simpson, ‘Individualism versus 
Collectivism: An Evaluation of section 14 of the Trade Union Reform and 
Employment Rights Act 1993’ (1993) 22 ILJ 181. For background see Cheall v APEX 




promotion, transfer, redundancy, security of employment, permissible forms of 
engagement, grievance, disciplinary and dismissal procedures, recruitment levels, 
training, apprenticeships, restructuring, the introduction of change and new 
technology, non-discrimination, equal pay, closure of the gender gap, adjustments for 
the disabled, trade union facilities and check-off, trade union membership or fair 
shares arrangements, the collective bargaining machinery itself (including its possible 
extensions) and disputes resolution.64 
 
Apart from the creation and powers of Sectoral Employment Commissions, there is 
also the question of the legal effect of their Agreements (in the case of commissions 
established on a bipartite basis) or Awards (in the case of commissions established on 
a ‘tripartite basis’).   It was an Achilles heel of the JICs in the past that they applied 
only to those who were party to them, which on the employer’s side meant federated 
firms only.   Wages Council orders on the other hand applied as a matter of law to all 
workers in the sector covered by the order in question, and were enforceable both by 
the wages inspectorate as a matter of criminal law and through the employment 
contract as a matter of civil law.   
 
As suggested above, the principle of ‘legalisation’ should apply to both Agreements 
(when operating in a bipartite manner) and Awards (when operating in a tripartite 
manner).65  The worker would obviously have the right to enforce a term of the 
agreement applying to him or her personally, 66 but we consider that both employers 
and unions which are party to a Sectoral Employment Commission should have the 
right to initiate legal action to enforce its Agreements or Awards against a defaulting 
employer (or hypothetical worker).67  Although it ought to be possible to negotiate 
more favourable terms of an Agreement or an Award at enterprise level (on which see 
 
64 TULRCA 1992, ss 178, 218, and 244 also provide useful checklists.   Compare 
Wages Councils Act 1979, s 14. All these go well beyond the ‘pay, hours and 
holidays’ to which the recognition procedure is restricted: Sched A1, para 3(4).  
65 For the avoidance of doubt this does not mean that collective agreements should be 
legally enforceable between unions and employers, which is a separate question from 
the legal enforceability of the parts of agreements designed to regulate terms and 
conditions of employment. 
66 Proposed by the Manifesto: Ewing, Hendy and Jones n.2, at 39. 
67 This would be in addition to a Labour Inspectorate to enforce these and other 




below), extreme care would need to be taken about derogations below the minimum 
standards.68 
 
7. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND WORKPLACE 
REPRESENTATION 
 
This scheme of course would be a big change from what we now have, and it would 
be as big a challenge for trade unions as for anyone else.   In many trade unions there 
will be only a vague memory of multi-employer bargaining, and in others the memory 
will not be a happy one.   It is not to be overlooked that a number of key officials 
strongly supported the Donovan Commission’s proposal to move from sectoral to 
enterprise based bargaining, partly because of what they saw to be the restraining 
effects of the former.  Jack Jones made clear his disdain for JICs on several occasions 
in his autobiography, explaining that he had: 
 
never formed a high opinion of joint industrial councils, which all too often 
had seemed to me to be talking shops from which only meagre concessions 
were obtained.69   
 
These concerns need to be accommodated, particularly if workers in productive plants 
are to be rewarded for their efforts.   A scheme of the kind proposed so far will also 
be a challenge for those who have invested heavily in the union organising model, and 
to union officials who work well under the current exclusively enterprise based 
arrangements.  There will otherwise be serious questions of sectionalism and 
institutional self-interest, which will be a sometimes hidden reason to oppose reform.    
So no one should suppose that this will be an easy adjustment, though we are not 
suggesting that there is a binary distinction between regulatory and representative 
bargaining or between sectoral and enterprise bargaining. 
 
 
68 See the discussion of ‘inderogability’ in Lord Wedderburn, ‘Collective Bargaining 
at European Level: the Inderogability Problem’, in Wedderburn n.32. 
69 J. Jones, Union Man – An Autobiography, 2008 ed. (London: Harper Collins, 
2008), 65.  But note also his comment post Donovan that ‘a system devised nearly 
fifty years ago, and imposed at a time when trade union organisation was weak, is 




So as suggested above, sectoral collective bargaining is not an alternative to enterprise 
level bargaining.70 On the contrary, the two are complementary, sectoral bargaining a 
base on which enterprise level bargaining can take place, necessary to adapt the 
provisions of the agreement to the needs of the parties in the enterprise.  Indeed, such 
enterprise based bargaining is crucial to the long-term success of sectoral bargaining 
since only unions with strength at the workplace will have leverage at the national 
bargaining table. Furthermore, sectoral bargaining without enterprise based 
bargaining and an enterprise based trade union presence is a recipe for the alienation 
of workers from their unions, and an encouragement for free riders.  
 
European systems with sectoral bargaining arrangements also have procedures for 
workplace representation, either to make the sectoral agreement operative at 
workplace level, or to deal with issues that are not covered by the sectoral agreement 
in the first place.   The Ministry of Labour Industrial Relations Handbook of 1961 
reminds us that in the UK that role was performed mainly by shop stewards,71 with 
the Donovan Commission later criticising these arrangements for being informal in 
the sense that there were often no written agreements setting out mutual rights and 
duties.72   In other systems - notably the German - sectoral bargaining is 
 
70 Nor do we suggest that there is a binary distinction between regulatory and 
representative bargaining. 
71 Ministry of Labour, Industrial Relations Handbook n.26, ch 6. 
72 Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers’ Associations (Chairman Lord 




complemented by other systems of workplace representation in the form of works 
councils,73 and worker directors.74 
 
In our view, the extension of collective bargaining is not simply about the expansion 
of horizontal measures for sectoral standard setting, but also for simultaneously 
deepening vertical enterprise based trade union activity, vertical in the sense that the 
trade union role should be embedded from the cloakroom to the boardroom.75  The 
two (the horizontal and the vertical) should be highly integrated: worker 
representation by trade unions at all levels within a firm suggest that the firm in 
question is less likely to oppose sectoral bargaining, while sectoral collective 
bargaining is said to suggest that firms are less likely to oppose enterprise 
representation (at least in the form of collective bargaining if not otherwise). 
 
So far as enterprise based collective bargaining is concerned, Bob Simpson’s writings 
illuminated the difficulties associated with legislation designed to encourage such 
procedures, there now having been three attempts at legislation in the UK.76   So far 
as the first of these is concerned (the Industrial Relations Act 1971), it was in 
Simpson’s terms ‘a spectacular failure’, foundering ‘on the rocks of union opposition 
 
73 Although there is some support for the latter among scholars in the UK, this is an 
idea that has failed to capture the imagination of the wider trade union movement.   
This is perhaps because in a decentralised collective bargaining system such as our 
own, non-union based works councils are seen to be in direct conflict with union 
based arrangements for enterprise collective bargaining. But note the fascinating 
account of consultative committees ‘at the place of work’ as reported in the Ministry 
of Labour, Industrial Relations Handbook n.26, where it is said in relation to British 
workplaces that ‘it is usual for works councils to include among the subjects they 
discuss: (i) Changes or improvements in methods of production and related matters, 
including the encouragement of suggestions within the factory’ (at 127).   There is no 
quantitative assessment of these practices in ‘private industry’ though the clear 
implication is that such practices were prevalent, in which case there is not much new 
in the 2002 Directive or the Regulations implementing it, save the absence of a strong 
collective bargaining culture to nurse them along.  
74 See J Williamson, All Aboard - Making worker representation on company boards 
a reality (London: TUC, 2016). 
75 On which see the especially important R. Dukes, The Labour Constitution – The 
Enduring Idea of Labour Law (Oxford: OUP, 2014), ch 3.    
76 Industrial Relations Act 1971; Employment Protection Act 1975; and Employment 





and management indifference’.77  So far as the second is concerned (the Employment 
Protection Act 1975), this too failed, though for different reasons, though it had much 
in common with the 1971 Act, both being short-lived initiatives trapped in the 
transitional space between an epoch that had gone and another yet to come.    
 
With the benefit of hindsight, the 1971 Act was too much a break with the immediate 
past in attempting to switch from an administrative model to a statutory model of 
labour law, while the 1975 Act was too close to what it sought to replace by retaining 
the administrative form of labour law at a time when the nature and purpose of 
administrative law was changing.   ACAS confronted the limits as well as the power 
of administrative law, the latter awakening from a long sleep in 1964,78 with the 
Lords in Padfield only four years later giving fair notice that wide discretionary 
power was no longer to be indulged.79  This was a cue that those who drafted the EPA 
1975 did not hear (or to which they did not listen). 
 
Although the powers of ACAS were restored by the House of Lords reversing two of 
three highly contentious Court of Appeal decisions of the late 1970s, as Wedderburn 
pointed out, this was after the government had announced its intention to repeal the 
recognition procedure altogether;80 in these circumstances, the judges could afford the 
luxury of magnanimity.   But with the incidence of judicial review about to explode 
after the Order 53 procedural reforms in 1978,81 Simpson was right to be sceptical 
about the future of the recognition procedure once the government, by these reforms, 
 
77 Lewis and Simpson n.12, 21. 
78 Ridge v Baldwin [1964] AC 40.   The courts were not completely silent and 
administrative law was not wholly benign: H. Laski, ‘Judicial Review of Social 
Policy in England:  A Study of Roberts v Hopwood’ (1926) 39 Harvard Law Review 
832; W.I. Jennings, ‘The Courts and Administrative Law – The Experience of English 
Housing Legislation’ (1936) 49 Harvard Law Review 426. Nor were judges 
unconcerned about the expansion of the administrative state. See Lord Hewart of 
Bury, The New Despotism (London: Ernest Benn Ltd, 1929) (a collection of the Lord 
Chief Justice’s ‘sensational essays on the administrative practices of government’: 
R.J. Smith, Book Review, (1930) 39 Yale Law Journal 763), and subsequently the 
Report of the Committee on Ministers’ Powers, Cmd 4060 (1932).    
79 Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1968] AC 997. 
80 Lord Wedderburn, ‘Industrial Relations and the Courts’ (1980) 9 ILJ 65. 
81 H.W.R .Wade and C.F. Forsyth, Administrative Law, 11th ed (Oxford: OUP, 2014), 




had effectively vindicated and legitimised the new and growing supervisory 
jurisdiction of the courts. 
 
The game had changed, with the result that it was thus necessary to accept that ‘a 
third party [adjudicator] cannot operate successfully on the basis of legal rights and 
procedures which establish broad general powers and a wide measure of discretion’.82    
For Simpson there were thus two options:  one was to rely on a body such as ACAS 
having general powers to resolve disputes, rightly thought now to be insufficient to be 
effective.   The other was to build on the 1975 Act with more ‘tightly drawn 
procedures’ and potentially ‘coercive sanctions’, the recent experience of judicial 
review revealing the ‘impossibility of devising provisions which leave no scope for 
judicial amplification’.83 
 
8. THE STATUTORY RECOGNITION SCHEME 
 
The third and current statutory recognition scheme - restricted to enterprise level 
bargaining - is rooted very firmly in what might be referred to as a ‘labour law 
model’, and to that extent reflects a triumph of sorts for the 1971 Act’s approach (and 
in some respects its content), in what had been a decade of transition to a different 
kind of law.   It also reflects the changing nature of administrative law and the 
impossibility now of using the administrative model as the core means to promote 
collective bargaining.   That model has become even less plausible as judicial power 
and the principles on which they rest were strengthened by the Human Rights Act 
1998 and the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 respectively.84 
 
The current statutory recognition scheme is a labour law scheme in the sense that it 
eschews a wide discretion in a statutory agency, in favour of legal rights and duties 
for the parties (trade unions and workers on the one hand and employers on the other).  
 
82 Simpson n.49, 83. 
83 Ibid. 
84 For a sober assessment of the former (HRA), see Simpson n.52 (HRA as another 
potential danger), and Simpson n.16, (sceptical of the HRA’s potential to advance 
workers’ interests). And see B Simpson, ‘Judicial Control of the CAC’ (2007) 46 ILJ 
287, and in particular the discussion relating to the HRA aspects of the Racing Post 




In contrast to the 1975 Act whereby a union could refer a recognition issue to ACAS, 
the 1999 Act refers to a trade union ‘seeking recognition to be entitled’ to conduct 
collective bargaining.85   The foregoing is an entitlement as against the employer, 
which if necessary will crystallise into an order by a quasi-judicial body (the CAC) 
that the employer recognises the union, provided a large number of eligibility, 
admissibility and support criteria are met. 
 
The latter is a development and trajectory that Simpson had fully anticipated, albeit 
with strong reservations.   But in moving from an administrative law to a labour law 
model, it was necessary to give trade unions not only the right to make a complaint 
but also rights in the complaint to deal with the reluctant and hostile employers, rights 
which are unnecessary in a system where the third party conciliator, mediator, or 
arbiter does not hear a recognition complaint but has responsibility to resolve a 
‘recognition issue’.   Simpson’s seminal article on the statutory procedure quickly 
drew attention to the failures in this respect, informed by the considerable body of 
evidence from other jurisdictions where procedures of this kind are in operation.86 
 
The changing form of legislative model from administrative law to labour law was not 
under the provisions introduced by the Employment Relations Act 1999 calculated to 
lead to any greater success for the legislation (assuming that success can be judged 
from legislation that was unclear as to its purpose).  Unlike the 1975 Act, the new 
recognition procedure operated in an environment in which there was no obligation 
on any public authority or anyone else to promote collective bargaining, this duty of 
ACAS having been removed in 1993 and not restored since.87  In addition, as 
Simpson pointed out, collective labour law was now projecting contradictory 
messages, the new procedure operating in an otherwise hostile legal climate.88 
 
 
85 Employment Protection Act 1975, s 11 and TULRCA 1992, Sch A1, para 1, 
respectively. 
86 Simpson, n.52. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid. Also on the 1999 Act are Bogg n.11, Part 3; and T. Novitz 'A Revised Role for 
Trade Unions by New Labour: The Representation Pyramid and “Partnership”' (2002) 




But that apart, it seems to us that the statutory recognition model was bound to fail, if 
success is to be judged by increasing collective bargaining coverage, or even by the 
less demanding standard of stopping the haemorrhage of collective bargaining 
density.   We may cavil about the context, but the more fundamental cause is the very 
model (almost regardless of its internal design) if used exclusively as the vehicle for 
collective bargaining growth.    In this respect it is striking that when comparisons are 
made with collective bargaining density worldwide, there is no country which has 
adopted the enterprise based representative model of collective bargaining that has a 
collective bargaining density in excess of 35%. 
 
We believe that this tells us something about the inherent limitations of the model, 
which have been brutally exposed in the United States in particular, but basically boil 
down to the huge logistical problem for trade unions in trying to organise company by 
company in what may be a hostile environment, and retaining members during long 
campaigns, which may be extended by aggressive litigation at the suit of the 
employer.    In our view, such a scheme can succeed only if it has much more limited 
ambitions as a complement to other forms of intervention, such as the collective 
bargaining proposals referred to above, dealing as a result with the question of 
workplace representation in a system focused primarily elsewhere. 
 
As the OECD pointed out as long ago as 1994,89 employer resistance to a trade union 
presence at enterprise level is thought likely to diminish where collective bargaining 
affecting the employer in question takes place at other locations.   The purpose of 
enterprise bargaining in a system of sector wide bargaining is to apply and build upon 
the sector terms which in most cases are likely only to be a minimum standard.   As 
discussed above, this means that there will be scope for enterprise bargaining on pay 
and other terms and conditions, and for the flexible implementation of standards 
established by sector wide agreements.   Sector agreements would set a floor not a 
ceiling.   
 
The OECD view may be rather optimistic, and is certainly no reason for not 
anticipating the likelihood of resistance and legislating to deal with it.   Apart from 
 




effective coercive measures designed to discourage and penalise employer bad 
practice, this can be achieved by a more careful design of the procedure to draw 
resistance in other ways.  This is necessary to avoid the ‘death or glory’ nature of the 
US model, by ensuring a more graduated route to full recognition.90  In this way, a 
representative union that does not have majority support sufficient to justify 
negotiating rights would nevertheless have the right to negotiate on behalf of its 
members, as well as enjoy consultation rights of various forms.              
 
 
9. ADAPTING THE STATUTORY RECOGNITION SCHEME 
 
The question then is how to adapt the ineffective recognition scheme inherited from 
the Blair government and retained (so far) by the Cameron and May governments to 
the proposed new circumstances.91   Here we share the critique of Simpson that the 
existing procedure is too complex, and that it gives too much power to employers in 
the course of union organising drives and recognition campaigns,92 to which we 
would add that it provides too many opportunities for destructive litigation in the 
CAC and the High Court by hostile employers.  The classic example of the latter was 
the Cable and Wireless case, in which there were five contested questions requiring 
CAC determination, as well as a judicial review.93  
 
There are two issues here.  One is the right of a union to bargain on behalf of a group 
of workers, and the other is the right of a worker to be represented by a trade union.  
So far is the former is concerned, in our view the statutory scheme could be greatly 
simplified, and the power of the hostile employer greatly reduced, if the procedure 
ended at the admissibility stage. That is to say, what is currently the admissibility 
 
90 On which see K.D. Ewing, ‘Trade Union Recognition – A Framework for 
Discussion’ (1990) 9 ILJ 209, and P.L. Davies and C. Kilpatrick, ‘UK Worker 
Representation after Single Channel’ (2004) 33 ILJ 31. 
91 On employer proposals for change, see CBI, Making Britain the Place to Work – 
An Employment Agenda for the New Government (London: CBI, 2010) – designed to 
tighten the statutory recognition procedures still further. 
92 Simpson n.52. As Alan Bogg has shown this power has not been addressed by 
subsequent amendments designed to deal with employer abuse: A. Bogg, ‘The Mouse 
That Never Roared: Unfair Practices and Union Recognition’ (2009) 38 ILJ 390. 
93 On Cable and Wireless, see H Collins, K D Ewing and A McColgan, Labour Law 




stage should be the final stage, in the sense that it should be enough that a union can 
demonstrate to the adjudicator – whether  ACAS or the CAC as at present for this 
purpose - that at the point of application it is likely to have majority support amongst 
a group of workers on behalf of whom it has a mandate to act. 
 
Also for this purpose, the evidence of majority support would be confidential and 
would not be shared with the employer,94 and should be treated as sensitive personal 
data.95  It should be for the union to decide which groups of workers on behalf of 
whom to seek a mandate, not the employer, the CAC, or the State.   Unions would 
most likely tailor so called bargaining units to their areas of strength within the 
enterprise, a practice which as rational actors we would expect them to adopt, and to 
which we see no reasonable objection.   Collective bargaining would be limited to 
these groups of workers and it would be a matter for the employer as to whether to 
extend the benefits of any agreement beyond the represented group. 
 
This means that there would be no CAC hearing about bargaining units, though the 
problem of bargaining units has perhaps not been a problem quite on the scale 
anticipated at the time the legislation was enacted.96   Nor would there be a need to 
demonstrate majority membership or the need for a ballot, whether or not there was 
majority membership.    This would minimise the damaging anti-union campaigns 
during organising drives, and reduce the influence of lawyers and consultants in such 
circumstances.   It is also necessary to remove the ability of employers to avoid 
recognition of independent unions by establishing non-union based staff associations 
– such as the News International Staff Association - as alternatives.97 
 
There is of course no guarantee that an employer would give effect to any recognition 
order by the adjudicator (whether ACAS or the CAC), which brings us to the question 
 
94 See AEEU and GE Caledonian, CAC Case No TUR 1/120/(2001). 
95 Data Protection Act 1998, s 2. 
96 But see R (Kwik-Fit (GB) Ltd) v Central Arbitration Committee [2002] EWCA Civ 
512. 
97 See also R (Boots Management Services) v CAC [2014] IRLR 278 and [2014] IRLR 
887. There are also substantive defects with the recognition scheme such as its 
limitation to ‘pay, hours and holidays’ (though other matters may be agreed). Space 





of sanctions, which as Bob Simpson pointed out  is ‘a touchstone issue for labour 
lawyers’.98    Here we share Simpson’s concerns about the practicality of current 
arrangements (particularly in contrast to the 1975 scheme), which have yet to be 
seriously tested, for reasons unlikely to include the effectiveness of the regime in 
question.   Although the 1975 scheme had many weaknesses, one advantage it 
enjoyed over the current scheme was the remedy of unilaterally triggered arbitration, 
even if the latter was not used to its full potential.99   
 
We accept that there may be employers who will seek to avoid meaningful enterprise 
level collective bargaining, whatever happens.   But the imposition by law of sectoral 
collective agreements will be a source of persuasion and encouragement to bargain at 
establishment level.   So too would a provision in a universally applicable sectoral 
agreement that would allow unions to refer enterprise based disputes about the 
application of sectoral agreements or awards for arbitration by either the CAC or 
preferably the disputes procedure in the agreement itself.  Furthermore, given that the 
right to bargain collectively is a human right,100 any arbitral award should include an 
element of mandatory compensation awards for violation of the right. 
 
A further important change is necessary to underpin these proposed enterprise 
arrangements.   This relates to situations where for whatever reason there is no 
enterprise based collective bargaining affecting workers generally or particular groups 
of workers.  In these situations, it is important to recall the ILO principle that 
‘workers’ organizations should nevertheless be able to conclude a collective 
agreement on behalf of their own members’.101    This would require a change to 
domestic law and in particular the Employment Relations Act 1999, sections 10-13 
which is currently limited to provide a right for workers to be accompanied by a trade 
union official in grievance and disciplinary matters. 
 
 
98 Simpson n.52, 211-2. 
99 On these procedures, see B. Doyle, ‘A Substitute for Collective Bargaining? The 
CAC's Approach to s16 of the Employment Protection Act 1975’ (1980) 9 ILJ 154.  
100 Demir and Baycara v Turkey [2008] ECHR 1345.  
101 B. Gernigon, A. Odero and H. Guido, ‘ILO Principles Concerning Collective 




As this provision currently stands, however, there are two defects.   The first is that it 
allows for trade union representation in relation to grievances about existing terms 
and conditions but not grievances about a change to existing terms and conditions,102 
a distinction (‘rights’ v ‘interests’). This cannot be justified by reference to the 
ECtHR jurisprudence by which the right to be accompanied is now underpinned.103  
The right to accompaniment should therefore extend to all matters which a worker 
wishes to raise with the employer. And secondly, the provisions do not allow for the 
collective representation of workers or the representation by a trade union in relation 
to a grievance of a collective nature (such as a pay cut imposed on a group of 
workers, or the failure to accede to a pay rise sought by a group of workers). The 
provisions should thus be extended to permit the union representative to raise with the 




The UK has historically operated two quite different kinds of collective bargaining 
system and has used two quite different kinds of legal model for this purpose.   These 
are respectively the regulatory collective bargaining model, based on multi-employer 
agreements, created and grown by administrative law; and the representative 
collective bargaining model based on the enterprise or parts thereof, created and 
operated by labour law techniques.   What is proposed here is a rediscovery of the 
former and reconciliation with the latter, using legislation to empower administrative 
action while minimising bureaucratic discretion, in an era of greater judicial power. 
One of the challenges for trade unions under a framework such as that described 
above is to avoid such a focus on top-down arrangements as would distract from 
‘building from the bottom’.  There is also a concern that a great deal of effort will be 
spent improving employment conditions for workers who are not members of the 
union.   In the past, that problem could be addressed, albeit not wholly eliminated, by 
closed shop arrangements, which of course are generally not permissible as a result of 
 
102 Employment Relations Act 1999, s 13(5): ‘For the purposes of section 10 a 
grievance hearing is a hearing which concerns the performance of a duty by an 
employer in relation to a worker.’ 




the ECtHR’s jurisprudence,104 though they may not be forbidden in all 
circumstances.105 
 
A collective bargaining strategy of the kind described here is not inconsistent with 
organizing.   There should be no doubt that the route to trade union revival will 
always be grass-roots organising and recruitment, and it should be emphasized that 
trade unions must have a right of entry to the workplace.106   Equally, trade unions 
need impact as well as members, and their effectiveness will be judged by the number 
of lives they touch, as well as the number of members they have.   It is true that in 
countries with regulatory collective bargaining models, there tends to be a huge gap 
between bargaining density on the one hand and membership density on the other.   
But there are steps that can be taken to mitigate problems.107 
 
The task of rebuilding is enormous, requiring great multi-disciplinary skills.  Above 
all it requires the commitment of government. But it is hard to see what the alternative 
is.  We can continue to administer palliative care to collective bargaining as a 
diminishing institution, which experience shows will continue to decline and will 
become the pursuit of an ever smaller minority of the working population, to the 
detriment of all.   Or a new government can mobilise its vast public powers to rebuild 
 
104 Young, James and Webster v UK [1981] ECHR 4. There are also restrictions under 
the European Social Charter of 1961, despite clear intentions that the closed shop 
should not be restricted by its provisions. 
105 The government did not argue the point and did not seek to defend the closed shop 
in any circumstances ([58]). Nevertheless, Art 11(2) was considered by the majority 
and dismissed on the ground that ‘the railway unions would in no way have been 
prevented from striving for the protection of their members’ interests … through the 
operation of the agreement with British Rail even if the legislation in force had not 
made it permissible to compel non-union employees having objections like the 
applicants to join a specified union’ ([64]). This leaves open the case where the 
unions would ‘have been prevented from striving for the protection of their members’ 
interests’.  
106 This would be in order to recruit, advise or represent workers. Such rights require 
amplification beyond the space available here but are a crucial limb of the pincer 
movement to re-establish collective bargaining in the UK, to avoid further the 
portrayal of sectoral collective bargaining as a solely top down measure.  
107 Such steps include mandatory contributions to union costs in conducting 
bargaining (‘Fair Shares Fees’).   In taking these steps it would be important to take 
into account relevant international obligations. See Confederation of Swedish 
Enterprise v Sweden, Complaint 12/2002 (European Committee of Social Rights), 




collective bargaining structures to advance a (i) more democratic, (ii) more equal, (iii) 
more economically efficient, and (iv) more legally compliant society (the Four 
Pillars).   Democracies have and make choices.    
 
Building on earlier work,108 in the space available we have tried to set out in the pages 
above  and in the context of the current crisis in collective labour law, our proposals 
for the establishment of the new framework and the means by which we believe that 
alternative can be pursued through law and State power.      
 
 
108 Ewing and Hendy n.4 above. 
